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INTRODUCTION
The role of Portugal during World War II was marked by the
prevalence of the Anglo-Portuguese Alliance in a context of com-
plex, and shifting, political and military considerations. To under-
stand Portugal's role, it is necessary first to eliminate stereotypes
about European dictators. I will then try to convey a sense of the
complexity of the situation through a brief reflection on the different
meanings of freedom, the fundamental nature of the Anglo-
Portuguese Alliance, and the tangled web between the Azores facili-
ties and Portuguese wolfram exports to Germany.
* University of Aviero, Portugal.
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Distinguishing the essential from the secondary, it becomes possi-
ble to understand that, beyond frequent discussions and sometimes
acrimonious exchanges, the Western democracies preferred to deal
with Salazar rather than promote a democratic transition. The Cold
War merely provided a convenient rationale to an earlier strategic
partnership.
Finally, I will refer to the fact that, although Portuguese neutrality
resulted from Allied political and military considerations, it had the
added benefit of establishing a platform for Jewish organizations and
a safe haven for European refugees.
I. MISLEADING STEREOTYPES
It is a temptation to reduce complex phenomena to stereotypes. In
a world of intricate relationships and overflowing information
stereotypes promise to simplify the diversity of human experience
into a handful of accessible notions. But if they are convenient, they
may also be extremely misleading. For example, the stereotype of
dictatorship suggests that in the context of World War II, a dictator is
on the side of the Axis pursuing an anti-Semitic policy. In practice,
however, such a stereotype ignores national cultures, geopolitical
alignments, and the origin and evolution of political regimes.
Salazar, the Portuguese dictator, was aware of the power of ideo-
logical stereotypes, and he was careful to stress the difference be-
tween the internal characteristics of his regime and his foreign pol-
icy. In October 1941, in a meeting with the British Ambassador, he
stated clearly:
It is thought [in the Embassy] that, because England is democratic and
liberal and parliamentarian, and the Portuguese regime is anti-democratic,
anti-liberal and anti-parliamentarian ... it is thought or continues to be
thought that the true friends of England, the defenders of the alliance, the
guarantors of Portuguese fidelity to the traditional friendship, are the
enemies of the [Portuguese] Government .... I
1. IX MINIST.RIO DOS NEGOCIOS ESTRANGEIROS, DEZ ANOS DE POLITICA
EXTERNA: A NAQAO PORTUGUESA E A SEGUNDA GUERRA MUNDIAL 331 (1974).
Of course, when Salazar told the British Ambassador that he was a defender of the
Alliance, he was telling the Ambassador not to be friendly to the members of the
opposition; it appears the implied recommendation was generally heeded by Brit-
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This sort of problem was more likely to arise in connection with
the United States, especially when decisions were made in Wash-
ington with little knowledge about conditions in Europe. George
Kennan, the former United States Chief of Affairs in Lisbon, knew
how difficult it was to deal with preconceived ideas an ocean away
from Portugal. He recalled in his memoirs some such difficulties. He
noted for instance, "the legation [was] obliged to intervene vigor-
ously in Washington to prevent various eager beavers in General
Donovan's OSS from developing plans for a revolt against Portu-
guese authority on the part of the inhabitants of the Azores, plans
based-apparently-on the theory that Salazar was a dangerous Fas-
cist and in league with the enemy."2 Hence, stereotypes do not assist
in understanding Portugal at the time of World War II.
II. DIFFERENT MEANINGS OF FREEDOM
When Jewish refugees arrived in Portugal they enjoyed a different
sense of freedom from that of the political opposition. In a study of
the refugee movement, Patrick von zur Miuhlen wrote, "For many
emigrants, Portugal was the first country in which they felt safe."'
The majority of refugees just wanted to move on to other lands.
During their brief stay, they were not afraid of Portuguese authorities
and felt welcomed by the people. In those times of hatred and de-
struction, this was more than enough for some of them to speak of
Portugal as a paradise.4
The Portuguese who opposed Salazar saw things from a different
perspective. The refugees who chose to stay in the country could
learn the different meanings of freedom with them. Ilse Losa, a Ger-
man Jewish refugee who settled permanently in Portugal, mentioned
that experience in one of her books.'
ish and American diplomats in Lisbon.
2. GEORGE F. KENNAN, MEMOIRS, 1925-1950. at 150 (1967). The Office of
Strategic Services ("OSS") was the precursor of the Central Intelligence Agency
("CIA").
3. PATRICK VON ZUR MUHLEN. FLUCHTWEG SPANIEN-PORTUGAL: DIE
DEUTSCH EMIGRATION UND DER EXODUS AUS EUROPA 1933-1945, at 115 (1992).
4. See id. (quoting among others Alma Mahler-Werfel); see also WILLIAM L.
SHIRER, BERLIN DIARY, 1934-1941, at 250 (1997).
5. See ILSE LOSA, SOB Clus ESTRANHOS (1962): Urbano Tavares Rodrigues,
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The situation was made even more complex because, due to a va-
riety of reasons ranging from geopolitics to ideology and a sense of
partnership, Allied sympathies were found among some of Salazar's
supporters, opponents, and the politically indifferent. In other words,
domestic political preference was not a sure guide to external align-
ment. Portugal had fought on the side of the Allies during World
War I, and for Portuguese soldiers and their families the Germans
were still considered the enemy. Even at the core of the repression
apparatus of the dictatorial regime, the British could find friends. For
example, the British Embassy in Lisbon considered the head of the
political police "impartial," and out of eight superior officers only
one was considered "pro-German. ,,6
III.THE ANGLO-PORTUGUESE ALLIANCE AS A
CORNERSTONE OF PORTUGUESE FOREIGN
POLICY
The Anglo-Portuguese Alliance dates back to 1373. Obviously, no
alliance can endure for such a long time unless it has firm geopoliti-
cal roots. Portugal needed the Alliance to counter the influence of
Castile, and later, as a small power with a large maritime empire, to
guarantee communications with the colonies. Great Britain shared
the profits of the Portuguese Empire, and enjoyed the strategic ad-
vantages of the Portuguese Mainland and the Islands. Historically,
neutrality was a luxury that Portugal could never afford. In spite of
conflicts and changes of regime, the Alliance withstood the passage
of time and remained fundamentally valid at the time of World War
II.
The Alliance was a cornerstone of Portuguese foreign policy. This
had military implications that were made clear even before the war
started. On December 14, 1938, Salazar, then acting as both Minister
of War and Minister of Foreign Affairs, addressed the officers of a
British Military Mission. He expressed the appreciation of his gov-
ernment for the work of the Military Mission hoping that it would
Alguns Exemplos da Projec o da Segunda Guerra Mundial na Fic¢do Narrativa
Portuguesa, in PORTUGAL, A GUERRA E Os NOVOS RUMOS DA EUROPA 65 (An-
t6nio Braz de Oliveira & Manuela Rego eds., 2d ed. 1995).
6. MARIA DA CONcEIQAO RIBEIRO, A POLCIA POLTICA DO ESTADO Novo,
1926-1945, at 119-20 (1995).
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lead to closer relations between the armies of Britain and Portugal,
and solve the problems "relating to the common defence. " '
Upon the declaration of war, the Portuguese Government acted in
accordance with the British. In a note issued September 1, 1939,
Portugal announced that the Alliance remained intact, but since the
British did not seek Portuguese assistance, Portugal would remain
neutral.8 In an Aide-mdmoire of September 5, 1939, the British Gov-
ernment confirmed the understanding:
His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom much appreci-
ate the assurances given by the Portuguese Government on the 1"
September and agree with them that observance of neutrality by
Portugal would best serve the mutual interests of both Portugal and
Great Britain in the present emergency. They are also in agreement
with the decision of the Portuguese Government to refrain from
making any declaration of neutrality.9
Thus, the Portuguese remained neutral without issuing a formal
declaration of neutrality. From the British perspective, Portuguese
non-belligerency was essential to keep Spain from entering the war
on the side of the Axis, and the situation in the Atlantic and Gibraltar
strengthened that point of view. The course of the war imposed a dy-
namic evaluation of the situation, but did not change the essential
premise of Portuguese neutrality.
In general terms, the United States joined the Allied consensus
about Portugal even before it was drawn into the war. In a letter
dated July 8, 1941, intending to dismiss "false reports" that impaired
relations between the United States and Portugal, President Roose-
velt assured Salazar:
May I say first of all that, in the opinion of the Government of the
United States, the continued exercise of unimpaired and sovereign
jurisdiction by the Government of Portugal over the territory of Por-
tugal itself, over the Azores and over all Portuguese colonies offers
complete assurance of security to the Western Hemisphere insofar as
the regions mentioned are concerned. It is, consequently, the consis-
7. III OLIVEIRA SALAZAR, DISCURSOS E NOTAS POL|TICAS 125 (1943).
8. See id. at 173-74.
9. VI MINISTIRIO DOS NEGOCIOS ESTRANGEIROS. supra note 1. at 32.
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tent desire of the United States that there be no infringement of Por-
tuguese sovereign control over those territories.'0
More than a certificate of good relations, the letter represented a
statement that the Portuguese islands and colonies were, in terms of
defence, part of the American sphere of influence. In that context, it
also represented a guarantee of Portuguese colonial sovereignty.
IV.THE AZORES AND WOLFRAM EXPORTS, OR
THE COMPLEXITIES OF THE ALLIANCE
In May 1941, the British acknowledged their incapacity to help
defend the Portuguese Mainland in case of attack." It is important to
consider this vulnerability and initial incapacity of the Allies to sup-
ply fuel and raw materials to Portugal when analysing Portuguese
trade with Germany. The Allies monitored that trade, and although
they were often contentious about its exact terms, they knew and ac-
cepted its rationale."
The broad consensus about the Portuguese role did not preclude
discussion-sometimes involving tremendous Allied pressure-
about concrete measures, both between Portugal and the Allies, and
between the United States and Britain. In November 1943, the State
Department suggested "a joint approach to the Portuguese Govern-
ment on the subject of the financial assistance to the enemy which
continues to be rendered by Portuguese banks in general and by the
Banco Espirito Santo in particular."' 3 The suggestion, following up
on an earlier one that was deemed inopportune, deserved a detailed
answer from Sir Ronald Campbell, the British Ambassador in Lis-
bon.
10. IX MINIST8RIO DOS NEGOCIOS ESTRANGEIROS, supra note 1, at 38. See also
app., doc. 1.
11. See VIII MINIST8RIO DOS NEGOCIOS ESTRANGEIROS, supra note 1, at 476.
12. See XV id. at 182-84 (reporting that in a formal agreement of 24 August
1942, Britain recognized Portugal's wolfram exports up to the limit of 2800 tons
until February 28, 1943, "for countries other than the United Kingdom and the
United States," which was a euphemistic way of saying "Germany and her Al-
lies").
13. Public Record Office: Viscount Halifax & Ministry of Economic Warfare,
Nov. 3, 1993, FO 115/3991.
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The Ambassador considered the State Department's suggestion
particularly ill-timed and incomprehensible at the present junc-
ture."1 4 He recalled that at the outset of the war, Salazar had remained
neutral with British approval. In what amounted to a reciprocal ac-
ceptance of rules of conduct, he noted that Salazar did not dispute the
British right to exercise the blockade, "although he contended that
the harshness with which we applied it played havoc with his eco-
nomic situation." 5 In principle, the British did not contest Salazar's
right to do business with any country he pleased inside the blockade.
This was the price of neutrality, and Portuguese banks had to finance
business conducted with Germany.
Sir Ronald Campbell provided an excellent summary of the per-
manent, essential value of Portuguese non-belligerency, and the sec-
ondary aspects that followed from it, the latter being subject to con-
stant re-examination:
Doctor Salazar has always contended that this situation was the
price we paid for strategic benefits accruing from Portugal's neutral-
ity and that if her neutrality instead of being strict had been benevo-
lent in our favour Spain would inevitably have thrown herself body
and soul into the arms of Germany. If this had happened the Penin-
sula would have been occupied and then North Africa, with the result
that the whole course of the war would have been altered to the ad-
vantage of the Axis. "You cannot have it both ways," he had said to
me over and over again....
At the time of the negotiations of the Azores agreement we ex-
pressly and publicly told him that we did not wish him to do other-
wise than maintain his neutrality on the mainland, although we
hoped to induce him by degrees to diminish supplies to Germany. At
present, however, he is still carrying on as before in the hope of sof-
tening the blow to Germany. If later on we can turn the screw, finan-
cial assistance will automatically fall off. I would strongly deprecate
any move at the moment.
6
In one respect, however, the British Ambassador was stretching
the argument to cool-off the American ally. Portuguese neutrality
14. See app., doc. 2.
15. See id.
16 Sep id.
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implied a balancing act, but it was not strict. By itself, the Azores
agreement, obtained under the invocation of the Anglo-Portuguese
Alliance, conferred such an advantage to the Allies that it might be
considered a casus bell1. Wolfram exports were intended to soften
the blow to Germany. Later, the British again invoked the Alliance,
and on June 5, 1944, Portugal agreed to cease Wolfram exports.
Communicating the news, the British Foreign Secretary commented
in the House of Commons:
His Majesty's Government warmly welcomes this further proof of
Anglo-Portuguese friendship and of the fidelity of Portugal to the an-
cient alliance. This has long been of great benefit to both parties and
it is the desire of His Majesty's Government that this unique rela-
tionship which has developed through the centuries shall remain as
strong a bond between the Governments and peoples of the British
Commonwealth and of Portugal in the future as in the past. The re-
cent decision of the Portuguese Government represents in the view of
His Majesty's Government a service to their cause comparable with
the grant of facilities in the Azores to His Majesty's Government last
October and one which should also prove an important factor in the
shortening of the war.17
The Alliance also gained expression in financial terms when the
Bank of Portugal signed an agreement with the Bank of England in
November 1940. Under this agreement, Britain obtained unlimited
credit only to be paid after the war in very favorable circumstances."
V. THE ESSENTIAL AND THE SECONDARY:
ALLIED SUPPORT TO SALAZAR
Removing stereotypes clarifies the primacy of the Anglo-
Portuguese Alliance. Beyond that, if we try to distinguish the essen-
tial from the secondary, we verify that Salazar managed to create a
working relationship with the Allies, and the Allies learned to work
with Salazar. There were problems and conflicts of interest, but Sala-
17. XV MINISTRIO DOS NEGOCIOS ESTRANGEIROS, supra note 1, at 532.
18. See BANK OF PORTUGAL HISTORICAL ARCHIVE, ACTA DA SESSAO DO
CONSELHO GERAL DE 12 DE ABRIL DE 1946 (noting as of August 8, 1945, the debt
amounted to 76 million pounds sterling). Final payment by Britain occurred in the
1960s.
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zar knew that Portugal had no alternative to the "oldest alliance," and
the Allies, despite an occasional sign to the Portuguese democrats,
preferred to deal with the dictator.
Some recent writings have suggested that the acceptance of the
dictator by the Allies was a product of the Cold War. In fact, the
Cold War provided a convenient ideological rationale for good rela-
tions with the dictator, but good relations and even support were the
rule for some time. For instance, when a German radio broadcast al-
leged in October 1939 that there were disagreements between Great
Britain and Portugal, the British Ministry of Information issued a cir-
cular telegram:
Listeners in South America must have been astonished to hear in a
recent German broadcast allegations that Great Britain was not satis-
fied with Portugal's policy of neutrality and was scheming for the
overthrow of Salazar's regime. The truth is, of course, that Dr. Sala-
zar is held in the highest esteem in this country for his political
achievements not less than his personal qualities, and that it is well
appreciated in British official circles that Portugal's present policy is
in the best interests of both countries."
In this as in other instances, the support of the foreign policy of the
Portuguese Government was equated with support for "the political
achievements" of the Portuguese dictator.
VI.PORTUGAL AND THE REFUGEES
Concerned with winning the war, the Allies evaluated the pros and
cons of Portuguese neutrality in strategic terms. It appears that the
issue of refugees was not considered. In other words, the Allies ap-
proved Portuguese neutrality, strictly in terms of its repercussions on
the war effort.
Portuguese neutrality, however, was also important because it
opened the way for many people to escape annihilation. Several in-
ternational relief organisations were active in Portugal; some work-
ing in and beyond the Iberian Peninsula. Portugal received about
100,000 refugees, but most of them ultimately left the country,
19. IX MINISTIRIO DOS NEGOcIos ESTRANGEIROS. supra note 1. at 169.
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mainly for the Americas. Even those refugees who were caught
without papers were not sent back by Portugal. 0
Many refugees, especially Jewish refugees, have mentioned the
warm welcome they received from the Portuguese population in gen-
eral.2 It appears, the Portuguese government was free from anti-
Semitism. The Portuguese Jewish community was very small but It
counted very influential members, among them a personal friend of
Salazar, Moses Bensabat Amzalak"
Openness towards the Jews in Portugal was already evident before
the war. In July 1938, the Portuguese Government instructed the
Ambassador in Berlin to remind the Reich Government, "in friendly
but firm terms that the Portuguese fundamental law making no dis-
tinction between the nationals of Jewish race and the others, obliged
the Portuguese Government to dispense to all of them the full pro-
tection due to each national [wanting] to return [to Portugal]." 23
This characteristic of the Portuguese regime has raised some curi-
osity. Apart from deeper aspects of Portuguese culture, it inevitably
led to speculation about Salazar's Jewish ancestry.2" In any case, anti-
Semitism was not an ideological component of the Portuguese
authoritarian regime."
20. See 13 ENCYCLOPEDIA JUDAICA Portugal, 919-26 (1996); Irene Flunser
Pimentel, Refugiados, DICIONARIO DE HISTORIA DO ESTADO Novo (Fernando Ro-
sas & J. M. Brandao de Brito eds., 1996); Diana Andringa, Abranches, Aristides de
Sousa Mendes do Amarale, DICIONARIO DE HISTORIA DO ESTADO NOVO (Fernando
Rosas & J. M. Brandao de Brito eds., 1996).
21. See FERNANDO DA COSTA, MASCARAS DE SALAZAR 58-9 (1997) (quoting
Sam Levy); see also JoS8 CAR9 JONIOR, ERICEIRA 50 ANoS DEPOIS: OS
REFUGIADOS ESTRANGEIROS DA 2A. GUERRA MUNDIAL (1995) (introduction by
Ant6nio Jos6 Telo).
22. See 2 ENCYCLOPEDIA JUDAICA, Amzalak, Moses Bensabat, 915-16 (1996).
23. YVES LEONARD, SALAZARISME ET FASCISME 201 (1996). See ERENSIA
SEFARDI, SPRING 8 (1997) (noting that some Jewish families in Europe were able
to invoke Portuguese ancestors to obtain Portuguese consular protection). In one
instance, nineteen people of the Jewish community of Salonika, deported In
August 1943 to Bergen Belsen, were released and allowed to travel to Lisbon In
June 1944, after a persistent exchange of notes between Lisbon and Berlin).
24. Apparently, Salazar knew about his Jewish forebears and was proud of it.
See ERENSIA SEFARDI, WINTER 7 (1997) (quoting from manuscript by Albert
Amateu).
25. Considerable research has been done on some of the themes dealt with In
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CONCLUSION
Historical research is never finished, and each generation looks at
the past from its own perspective. But in order to understand history,
we have to make an effort to go beyond isolated facts and abstract
notions, for nothing makes sense outside the context of its time.
In the case of Portugal, a small country on the European periphery,
it is essential not to confuse ideology with foreign policy. In essence,
Portugal remained neutral within the overall objectives of the Anglo-
Portuguese Alliance; and this modest but complex role made it pos-
sible for Portugal to contribute to the rescue of a large number of
refugees.
APPENDIX
DOCUMENT 1: FRANKLIN ROOSEVELT'S LETTER TO ANTONIO DE
OLIVEIRA SALAZAR 6
Washington, July 8, 1941
PRIVATE
My dear Doutor Salazar,
I am writing this entirely personal and informal letter to you in the
belief that it may be easier for me, in this manner, to put an end ef-
fectively to certain misunderstandings which have regrettably arisen
during recent weeks between our two Governments.
May I say first of all that, in the opinion of the Government of the
United States, the continued exercise of unimpaired and sovereign
jurisdiction by the Government of Portugal over the territory of Por-
tugal itself, over the Azores and over all Portuguese colonies offers
complete assurance of security to the Western Hemisphere insofar as
this presentation. See generally ANTONIO COSTA PINTO, OS CAMISAS AZUiS
(1994); ANTONIO TELO, PORTUGAL NA SEGUNDA GUERRA (1987); ANTONIO TELO,
PORTUGAL NA SEGUNDA GUERRA, 1941-1945 (1991): Douglas Wheeler, The Price
of Neutrality: Portugal, the Wolfram Question, and World War II. in 23 LUSO-
BRAZILIAN REVIEW at §§ 1-2 (1986); NUNO VALI8RIO. A MOEDA EM PORTUGAL.
1913-1947 (1984); FERNANDO ROsAS, PORTUGAL ENTRE A PAZ E A GUERRA
(1990); DICIONARIO DE HISTORIA DO ESTADO Novo (Fernando Rosas & J. M.
Brand~o de Brito eds., 1996).
26. See IX MINISTtRIO DOS NEGOcIOS ESTRANGEIROS. supra note 1. at 37-9.
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the regions mentioned are concerned. It is, consequently, the consis-
tent desire of the United States that there be no infringement of Por-
tuguese sovereign control over those territories.
This policy of the Unites States I made emphatically clear In the
message which I addressed yesterday to the Congress of the United
States concerning the steps which had been taken to assist the people
of Iceland in the defense of the integrity and independence of their
country.
I feel sure that there has never been any doubt in your own mind
with regard to this question and that the questions which have been
raised with regard thereto in the press have had their origin in false
reports deliberately circulated by propaganda emanating from gov-
ernments which have desired to impair the traditional relations be-
tween our two countries.
For all of the reasons I have mentioned above, this Government
views with the greatest gratification the steps which already have
been taken and which are being taken by your Government to
strengthen the defense of the Azores and other outlying portions of
the colonial possessions of Portugal so as to render any surprise at-
tack upon them by Germany, or by powers cooperating with Ger-
many, less likely of success.
I need merely add that in view of the vital importance to the
United States that Portuguese sovereignty over the Azores and cer-
tain other outlying Portuguese possessions remain intact, this Gov-
ernment will stand prepared to assist the authorities of Portugal in the
defense of those possessions against any threat of aggression on the
part of Germany, or of the powers responsive to Germany, should
your Government express to me its belief that such aggression is
imminent or its desire that such steps be taken. Any such measures
would, of course, be taken in full recognition of the sovereign rights
of Portugal and with categorical assurances that any American forces
sent to Portuguese possessions would be withdrawn immediately
upon the termination of the present war.
In the event that this contingency were to arise and the Govern-
ment of Portugal considered it desirable, because of the close rela-
tions which happily exist between Portugal and Brazil, to ask that the
Brazilian Government participate in these measures of defense, such
a step would be most satisfactory to the Government of the United
196 [14:185
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States. I feel certain that Brazil and the United States would cooper-
ate effectively and whole-heartedly in assisting the Portuguese Gov-
ernment and people in the defense of the Azores.
I have felt it desirable to clarify the situation completely in order
to have the assurance that there may not be the slightest misunder-
standing of these facts between you and myself.
Frankly, I have felt particularly chagrined that any question should
have arisen concerning my own attitude with regard to complete re-
spect for the sovereignty of Portugal. I say that because, as you will
remember, during the World War of 1914-1918, the Government of
Portugal made available to its allies and subsequently to the United
States the port of Horta as a fueling base and the port of Ponta Del-
gada as a naval base. At that time, as Assistant Secretary of the
Navy, I had the privilege of visiting those ports in the interest of the
United States Navy and I was thus afforded the opportunity of seeing
for myself how particularly close and friendly the relations between
the Portuguese people and the members of the naval forces of the
United States had become. There existed a complete spirit of coop-
eration between them and of course as soon as the international
emergency had passed, all of the forces of the allied and associated
powers were immediately withdrawn without the slightest detriment
to the sovereign jurisdiction of the Portuguese Government. Because
of this experience which I had, I should have a personal interest in
seeing to it that the relations between our two Governments and be-
tween our two countries were always conducted with a full reciprocal
respect for the sovereign rights of each and that in any form of coop-
eration which might be undertaken between Portugal and the United
States the best interests of the Portuguese people were completely
safeguarded.
With the assurances of my highest consideration and of my per-
sonal regard, believe me,
Yours very sincerely,
Franklin Roosevelt
AM. U. INT'L L. REv.
DOCUMENT 2: TELEGRAM FROM SIR RONALD CAMPBELL27
Nov. 5, 1943
State Dept's suggestion is particularly ill timed and incomprehen-
sible at the present juncture.
1. It is hardly necessary for me to recall that Doctor Salazar
having at the outset of the war remained neutral with our approval
has consistently claimed his full neutral rights.
2. He did not dispute our belligerent right to exercise the block-
ade although he contended that the harshness with which we applied
it played havoc with his economic situation. As regards goods pro-
duced in metropolitan Portugal i.e., inside the blockade, he has al-
ways claimed and exercised his right to do business with whom he
pleased. Apart from a number of measures (not inconsistent in the
aggregate) which we have induced him voluntarily to adopt, with the
view of reducing supplies to our enemies, we have been unable and
have indeed not sought to contest his claim in principle.
3. Doctor Salazar has always contended that this situation was
the price we paid for strategic benefits accruing from Portugal's
neutrality and that if her neutrality instead of being strict had been
benevolent in our favour Spain would inevitably have thrown herself
body and soul into the arms of Germany. If this had happened the
Peninsula would have been occupied and then North Africa, with the
result that the whole course of the war would have been altered to the
advantage of the Axis. "You cannot have it both ways," he had said
to me over and over again.
4. If business is to be conducted with Germany it must be fi-
nanced by Portuguese banks. While it may be inconsistent to black-
list commercial firms and not banks, we have been able to get away
with the former but would not get away with the latter since the
Portuguese Government would have forced the banks to carry out its
policy. The attempt would thus have amounted either to an open
challenge to Doctor Salazar or to a summons to modify his neutral
status.
5. At the time of the negotiations of the Azores agreement we
expressly and publicly told him that we did not wish him to do oth-
27. Public Record Office, FO 115/3991; repeated FO 371/34696.
[14:185
1998] PORTUGAL AND THE BRITISH ALLIANCE IN WWII 199
erwise than maintain his neutrality on the mainland, although we
hoped to induce him by degrees to diminish supplies to Germany. At
present, however, he is still carrying on as before in the hope of sof-
tening the blow to Germany. If later on we can turn the screw, finan-
cial assistance will automatically fall off. I would strongly deprecate
any move at the moment
6. Nor can I understand the State Department's suggesting it at a
time when the U. S. Government is about to seek facilities for itself
in the Azores and the best hope of success lies in offering the Portu-
guese generous treatment in every respect.
